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INDORSEMENTS AFTER MATURITY AND 
THE "NEW BILL" DOCTRINE 
BY JosEPH M. CoRMACK* AND BRucE BROWNEt 
Should subsequent presentment for payment and notice of dis-
honor be required in order to charge one who indorses a negotiable 
instrument after maturity? It will be assumed that the instrument 
by its terms is a time and not a demand mstrument, 1 and that the 
indorsement is by the one holding the instrument at maturity.2 
When a negotiable instrument is indorsed after maturity, there 
is an assignment of the chose in action possessed by the one holding 
the instrument when it became due. The character of that chose in 
action is affected by the presence or absence of presentment ·and 
notice of dishonor at maturity, and other facts. The discussion to 
follow will consider the relations among themselves of those who 
participate in such transfers. As pointed out, they have been 
parties to an assignment. Their relations could be governed en-
tirely by the law of assignments. This has not, however, been the 
viewpoint of the law or of the merchants whose customs gave rise 
to this branch of the law. It has been felt that the bill or note 
should continue to be governed by the principles relating to negoti-
able paper. 3 This would seem to be a natural way for those dealing 
with such instruments to regard the situation. It is. the viewpoint 
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. The act provides in 
Section 47 that an instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be 
such until discharged or restrictively indorsed, and' in Section 7 
"'Professor of Law, University of Southern California. 
tMember of the Bar of Burbank, California. 
lThis is the only form in which the problem has been passed upon judi-
cially, and the assumption will make the problem more clean-cut for purposes of 
discussion. The reasoning to be presented is applicable to demand instruments, 
in that it is believed that, if such an instrument is negotiated more than a 
reasonable time after issuance, presentment and notice should not be required 
in order to hold the indorser. McKinney v. Crawford, 8 S. & R. 347, 351, 357 
(Pa. 1822), reaching an opposite result, is such a case. The demand note was 
there held to have been past due when negotiated. 
2The existence of successive transfers would be immaterial in connection 
with nearly all the discussion to be presented. It would be material if the in-
dorsement after maturity were to be considered the creation of a "new note" 
instead of a "new bill." This contingency will be considered briefly. 
aoccasional statements to the effect that a past-due instrument is no longer 
negotiable are discussed in Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1104, 1105, 1123, 1129. 
[46] 
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that an instrument issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue is 
payable on demand. 4 
In general the position that negotiability continues after ma-
turity is undoubtedly sound. For example, the indorser after ma-
turity should be held to make the warranties which ordinarily 
accompany the indorsement of negotiable instruments. He should 
also be held to assume liability for payment, whatever may be the 
rule of the particular jurisdiction in regard to implying such an 
undertaking in connection with assignments generally. The point 
to which the following discussion will be directed is whether such 
an indorser should be given the benefit of the usual requirement of 
presentment for payment and notice of dishonor as a prerequisite 
to liability. If these steps are to be required, the rules relating to 
such action upon demand instruments will. apply, that is, the holder 
must so act within a reasonable time. A past-due instrument, hav-
ing no fixed future date for payment, necessarily has always been 
regarded as payable upon demand, as set forth in the provision of 
the Negotiable Instruments Law referred to. 
If the requirement of subsequent presentment and notice is to 
be made, it is an apt illustration of a "trap for the unwary." 
Normally these steps are taken at maturity. As to parties already 
upon the instrument, such action can have no effect if taken later. 
It is altogether unlikely that a taker after maturity will have the 
knowledge, or that it will occur to him, that there is a possibility 
of producing any legal effect as to any person through such action 
at a later date. Knowledge of the requirement of such action at ma-
turity tends to exclude the other possibility from his mind. There 
is nothing about the circumstances to suggest it to him. The in-
ference to be drawn from the facts are all the other way. The 
instrument already has failed to result in payment at the con-
templated time. Already it "comes to the· taker disgraced." The 
indorser knows that the instrument has failed to operate as intended. 
If he himself has already made presentment at maturity, notice to 
him of subsequent dishonor is useless. If the instrun1ent is ac-
companied by a certificate of protest, or there is other evidence that 
presentment has been made, the uselessness of a repetition of such 
action is made apparent to the indorsee. If no specific indication in 
that regard is made to him, at least he knows that the instrument 
has been in the hands of his transferor at maturity, and the trans-
feree may reasonably conclude that an attempt has been made to 
4Section 7 states that this is true "as regards the person so issuing, ac-
cepting, or indorsing it." 
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secure payment, or that there has been knowledge that such action 
would be unavailing. If he assumes that the indorser has been 
diligent, he will make the further assumption stated. It would seem 
that he should not be required to act upon an assumption that the 
one dealing with him has not been diligent. Certainly the indorser 
is not in a position to insist that his transferee must assume that no 
presentment has been made. He would thus be taking advantage 
of his own neglect. If information in regard to dishonor is im-
portant to the indorser, as indeed it may be, he has possessed the 
means to secure it. The indorser may assert that the fact that 
the instrument is past due makes it especially important to him that 
the indorsee take prompt steps to secure collection, and notify him 
in the event of failure, but the indorser's own want of action belies 
the contention, and has tended to mislead the taker, the more so the 
farther removed the transfer is from maturity. Here again the 
indorser is seeking to take advantage of his own default. The most 
weighty consideration, however, against imposition of the require-
ment of demand and notice upon the indorsee, is the great likeli~ 
hood, under the circumstances justifiable, that its existence will not 
occur to him. It is an ancient fundamental criterion by which to 
judge legal principles that they should, in so far as possible, con-
form to the ordinary practices of mankind. Strangely, in the con-
sideration of the problem, the seemingly obvious objection that the 
requirement constitutes a "trap for the unwary" apparently has not 
been noticed. 
The story of the early difficulties experienced in permitting 
actions by indorsees of bills and notes is familiar.5 In striving to 
overcome the obstacles felt to lie in the way of such actions, it was 
reasoned that every indorsement is "as a new bill," and that, there-
fore, the indorsee should be permitted to proceed upon it. The 
earliest reported case on a bill of exchange having appeared in 
1602,6 the words quoted are spoken in 1686 by Lord Holt/ who 
very likely acquired the idea from the merchants with whom he 
consulted in laying the foundations of the law in such matters. 8 It 
GSee 8 Holdsworth, History of the English Law (3rd ed. 1926) pp. 113-176. 
The development of the conception of negotiability upon the Continent is treated 
at pp. 140 et seq. 
6Martin v. Bourse, Cro. Jac. 6, 79 Eng. Rep. 6 (K. B. 1617). 
•Claxton v. Swift, 2 Show. 494, 89 Eng. Rep. 1062; Skinn. 255, 90 Eng. Rep. 
116; Comb. 32, 90 Eng. Rep. 325 (K. B. 1687). The question involved was whether 
an indorsee who had recovered judgment against the drawer, but had not taken 
out execution against him, could later sue an indorser. The same form of state-
ment is found in Hill v. Lewis, Skinn. 410, 90 Eng. Rep. 182 (K. B. 1694), and 
Tassell & Lee v. Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym. 743, 91 Eng. Rep. 1397 (K. B. 1695). 
~In the reports of other cases of the period the following forms of ex-
pression are used to describe the resemblance of an indorsement to a new bill: 
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was an easy ellipsis to state without qualification that an indorse-
ment "is" a new bill, and this form of expression is found as early 
as 1693.9 Discussing the period, Holdsworth says: "The rights of 
the indorsees depended upon the principle that each indorsement 
amounted in substance to the drawing of a new bill."10 In 1758, 
Lord Mansfield, after discussing the legal situation arising out of 
the indorsement of a note, said: "This is the very definition of a 
bill of exchange."11 In 1803, Lord Ellenborough said: "There is no 
distinguishing the case of an indorser from that of a drawer. . . . "12 
The "new bill" conception first appears in connection with a 
transfer after maturity in 1691. In the report of one of Lord Holt's 
cases in that year it is stated that all the merchants were agreed 
"that a bill negotiated after day of payment was like a bill payable 
at sight."13 This case marks the entrance mto the courts of law of 
the doctrine of continuance of negotiability after maturity. A few 
years later, after consulting with the merchants, Lord Holt held that 
a bill could be declared upon as such when negotiated after ma-
turity.14 No reported English case seems to have presented the 
question of the necessity of subsequent presentment for payment 
and notice of dishonor in connection with a negotiation after ma-
turity.15 
"like," Dehers v. Harriet, 1 Show. 163, 89 Eng. Rep. 513 (K. B. 1691); "in nature 
of," Hodges v. Steward, 12 Mod. 37, 88 Eng. Rep. 1148; 1 Salk. 125, 91 Eng. Rep. 
117 (K. B. 1693); Bomley v. Frazier, 1 Strange 441, 93 Eng. Rep. 622 (K. B. 1721); 
"quasi-," Anonymous, Skinn. 344, 90 Eng. Rep. 153 (K. B. 1693); and "tantamount 
to," Buller v. Cripps, 6 Mod. 29, 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (K. B. 1703). 
The thought was applied to indorsements upon notes as well as bills. "A 
goldsmith's note indorsed is as a bill of exchange against the indorser (sic)." 
Tassell & Lee v. Lewis, supra note 7. Because of the practices of goldsmiths, 
their notes were regarded as particularly like bills. Buller v. Cripps, supra note 
8, involved a note which was not a goldsmith's. 
o". . . The last indorsee may bring an action against any of the in 
dorsers, because every indorsement is a new bill, and implies a warranty by 
the indorser, that the money shall be paid." Williams v. Field, 3 Salk. 68, 91 
Eng. Rep. 696 (K. B. 1693). 
108 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 163. 
nHeylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669, 97 Eng. Rep. 503 (K. B. 1758). The point 
involved was whether demand upon the drawer of a bill was necessary in order 
that an indorsee might hold an indorser. · 
12Also, ". . . When it has been laid down that an indorser stands in all 
respects in the same situation as a drawer, all the consequences follow which 
are attached to the situation of the latter." Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East 481, 
102 Eng. Rep. 681 (K. B. 1803). The question involved was whether an indorsee 
might bring suit against an indorser of a bill immediately upon non-acceptance 
prior to maturity. • 
13Note to Dehers v. Harriet, supra note 8. 
14Mutford v. Walcot, 1 Ld. Raym. 574, 91 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K. B. 1700). 
UQther English cases referring to the "new bill" doctrine are: Lake v. 
Hales, 1 Atk. 281, 25 Eng. Rep. 791 (Ch. 1736); Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Bla. 569, 
126 Eng. Rep. 326 (C. P. 1791); Penny v. Innes, 1 C. M. R. 439, 149 Eng. Rep. 1152 
(Ex. 1834) (holding that a new stamp is not required); Allen v. Walker, 2 M. 
& W. 317, 150 Eng. Rep. 778 (Ex. 1837); Burmester v. Hogarth, 11 M. & W. 97, 
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The first American expression of the "new bill" doctrine which 
has been found appears in 1794, in a case passing upon the question 
whether one signing after maturity assumed the liability of an in-
dorser.16 In 1807, apparently for the first time in either country, 
the question whether, in order to hold an indorser after maturity, 
presentment and notice should be required, is considered. The 
judges of the highest Tennessee court of the period,17 while deciding 
the case upon the basis of an exception to the rule, said, in a brief 
per curiam opinion, without mentioning the "new bill" doctrine, 
that "there is the same necessity for demand of the drawer [sic-
maker of note] and notice of non-payment, if assigned after being 
due as before."18 Only a short interval elapsed until, in 1812, a 
decision squarely in point was rendered, discharging an indorser 
after maturity because he had not been held through demand and 
notice.19 The short opinion, per curiam, again without mentioning 
the "new bill" doctrine, proceeds upon the ground that such is the 
nature of the indorser's conditional contract, and states that "the 
books make no distinction on this point, whether a note be indorsed 
before or after it is due."20 
The numerous later cases to the same effect,21 with the excep-
tion of the few to be discussed, either simply state the requirement 
of presentment and notice within a reasonable time, or merely re-
state the "new bill" doctrine. The best considered decision, Bishop 
v. Dexter, appears in 1817, in the Supreme Court of Connecticut.22 
The decision is a very strong one, on the facts, in its requirement of 
presentment and notice. The note in question was first negotiated 
152 Eng. Rep. 730 (Ex. 1843); Matthews v. Bloxsome, 4 New Rep. 139 (C. P. 1864). 
The doctrine is set forth in the following early English texts: Bayley, Bills c:if 
E:ccliange, Cash Bills and Promissory Notes (1797) p. 31; Cunningham, Bills of Ex-
change, Promissory Notes, Bank Notes, and Insurances (3rd ed. 1766) p. 45; 
Kyd, Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (3rd ed. 1795); Roscoe, Bills of 
Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Bankers' Checks (1829) p. 2. 
16Bank of North America v. Barriere, 1 Yeates 360, 362 <Pa. 1794). Mr. 
Chief Justice McKean said: ''Every indorsement of a bill of exchange is con-
sidered as a new bill. After the day of payment in a note is expired, the in-
dorser cannot be looked on otherwise than as a new drawer." While the absence 
of presentment and notice was referred to in the argument, it is not touched 
upon in the opinion, and the facts would seem to negative requirement of such 
action, as the note had been indorsed while in the hands of the plaintiff, ap-
parently to gain time. The case is limited in this regard to the particular facts 
in McKinney v. Crawford, supra note 1, at 356. 
17The District, or Superior, Court. 
1BStothart and Bell v. Parker, 1 Over. 260 (Tenn. 1807). The case in-
volved a note. Insolvency of the maker at the time of indorsement was held 
to constitute an exception to the requirement of presentment and notice. 
19Berry v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 121, 6 Am. Dec. 267 (N.Y. 1812). 
:.!Old. at 122, 126. 
2ISome upon the ground that the presentment and notice were not within 
a reasonable time. 
222 Conn. 419 (1817). 
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by the payee, the defendant, after maturity, and after the maker 
had been sued and placed in jail.23 It was held that the indorsee 
under a second subsequent indorsement, who upon taking did not 
know that the note had been overdue when negotiated by the payee-
defendant, could not recover because of the absence of presentment 
and notice. Mr. Justice Gould, in one of the several opinions, said: 
"It may be observed, in the first place, that the understanding of 
the several indorsers and indorsees as inferable from the nature of the 
transaction, must have been, that, to create a right of action, upon either 
of the indorsements, such demand should be made, and notice given, 
by the indorsee. For otherwise, the liability of each indorser would 
be primary, unconditional; and an action would lie against him, upon 
his indorsement, instantly upon its being made, without any act what-
ever, to be done by the indorsee, to consummate his right of recovery. 
And the defendant's liability would, upon this supposition, be precisely 
the same as if, instead of indorsing another's note, he had given his own, 
payable on demand.24 
"Now, such a result, as this, would be evidently inconsistent with the 
views and intentions of all parties; and equally so with the nature, and 
legal effect, of the transaction. The indorsing of a note, is, in substance, 
the same thing, as the drawing of a bill of exchange: and there is 
nothing to take this case out of the general rule; which, as the note had 
already become payable, required the plaintiff to make demand of the 
maker, within a reasonable time .... Besides, the manifest inexpedi-
ence of mUltiplying exceptions to established general rules, in the mer-
cantile law, furnishes, in my judgment, a distinct, and strong objection 
to the motion. Such exceptions should be admitted only for the clearest 
and most decisive reasons: in as much, as they tend to complicate a 
class of transactions, in which all practicable simplicity is eminently 
important; and to create uncertainty, in a branch of the law, in which 
it would be more mischievous, than in almost any other."25 
In another case of the period,26 Mr. Justice Richardson of South 
Carolina contended that the indorser after maturity should be pro-
tected by the usual requirements because if he failed to· receive 
.2s1t was pointed out that the negotiation had ended the suit, and that the 
indorsee technically was required to proceed as though the instrument had never 
been sued upon. Id. at 422. 
24In another early case this thought was expressed in the form of a ques-
tion, which was later considered hard to answer-if an indorsement after ma-
turity "was a contract of absolute and immediate liability, why indorse, for 
what purpose draw, why not give his own note?" Mr. Justice Duncan, in Mc-
Kinney v. Crawford, supra note 1, at 351, 355 . 
.2GBishop v. Dexter, supra note 22, at 424. The last thought was expressed 
in another early case by saying that to relax the requirement of presentment 
and notice would "introduce uncertainty and confusion in a subject where it is 
highly. advantageous to the public there should be neither''-as a. necessity of 
public policy placing the taker of the past due instrument upon a procrustean 
bed of legal rigidity. Hill v. Martin, 12 Mart. 177, 183, 13 Am. Dec. 372, 375 
(La. 1822). 
26Poole v. Tolleson, 12 S. C. Law 199, 10 Am. Dec. 663 (1821). 
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notice of non-payment he would, like any other drawer, conclude 
that payment had been made, in accordance with his order, and be 
"lulled into the same security."27 The learned justice felt that the 
indorser after maturity had assured the indorsee that the money 
was still to be had upon demand, notwithstanding the inferences to 
be drawn from passage of the time originally set for payment. 28 
Again, the requirement of presentment and notice was justified 
upon the ground that, as the instrument was already overdue when 
negotiated, the indorsement amounted to an authority to endeavor 
to collect through the use of reasonable diligence.29 It was felt that 
"the indorser, in effect, says to the indorsee, this note was not paid 
to me when demanded, and I now give you the right and authority 
to collect it for the payment of your debt."30 As applied to the strict 
requirement of presentment and notice, this logic seems to be in-
verted, for if it is to be presumed that payment had been demanded 
and refused, the indorser also must have known that in all proba-
bility further demand would be useless. 
In 1859, Mr. Justice Baldwin of California stated that it was 
"the universal understanding of business men" that such an indorse-
ment amounted "to no more than a guaranty of the solvency of the 
maker; and that the indorsee may, if he makes demand upon the 
maker and fails to get the money, have recourse upon the in-
dorser."31 It is to be doubted whether, in connection with an over-
due instrument, such an assumption, to include the requirement of 
technical presentment and notice, ever was justified. In any event 
it is believed that it would not be today, particularly in cases where 
it was known that presentment already had been made at maturity. 
Hardly a voice of protest against application of the "new bill" 
doctrine in the present connection has been raised. In a South 
Carolina case in 1845, Chadwick & Co. v. Jeffers,32 though expressly 
refusing to dispense with the requirement of presentment and 
notice, it was held that "the duty of the holder, in these particulars, 
is limited to the use of such diligence, according to the circumstances 
of the case, that the indorser suffer no injury through his remissness 
27ld. at 202. 
28lbid. It was once suggested that the circumstance that a note was over-
due when indorsed almost called for greater diligence in making presentment 
and giving notice. It was reasoned that the passage of maturity "goes to lessen 
the credit of the drawer from supposed inability to pay," so that the indorser 
"ought not to be lulled by the laches of the holder into a false security that 
the note has been paid." Stockman v. Riley, 13 S. C. Law 398, 399 (1823). 
29Gray v. Bell, 31 S. C. 67, 44 Am. Dec. 277 (1845). The same case .appears 
upon a second appeal in 37 S. C. Law 71 (1846). 
aoid. at 71. 
atBeebe v. Brooks, 12 Cal. 308, 310 (1859). 
a230 S. C. Law 397, 44 Am. Dec. 260 (1845). 
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or neglect."33 Application of this limitation upon the doctrine would 
prevent discharge of the indorser in most cases. In the opinion Mr. 
Justice Frost presents cogent reasoning which logically would lead 
to denial of the requirement entirely. He points out that the rules 
requiring diligence in connection with negotiable instruments are 
designed for the protection of the secondary parties, and cites in-
stances in the law where notice is not necessary for that purpose, 
and is therefore not required. 34 He concludes that "the same prin-
ciple would dispense with notice of non-payment to the indorser of 
a note past due." He feels that it is not just to impose a loss upon 
the indorsee after maturity upon the ground that he has deprived 
the indorser of the opportunity "of taking prompt measures for 
recovery against the maker, which, while the note was in his pos-
session, he had already neglected to pursue, or had pursued ine£-
fectually."35 
A Pennsylvania case, Jordan v. Hurst/6 quickly overruled/7 in-
volving a non-negotiable note, contains" much generally applicable 
reasoning opposed to the doctrine. Mr. Justice Coulter said: 
" ... Where the note on its face carries the evidence of dishonor, 
when the day of demand is passed, there is every reason existing in the 
nature of commercial transactions, why the endorser should distrust the 
credit of the maker, for he has not redeemed his engagement; his 'word 
will not pass on "Change". ' There is every reason, therefore, to believe 
that the endorsee takes the note upon the sole credit of the endorser. 
The class of cases, however, which I am considering, assert that the 
blank endorsement of an over-due note amounts to an order to pay on 
sight, or on demand, and they thus make a new contract for the par-
ties subject to different responsibilities. But the whole tenor of the 
arrangement forbids this interpretation. It would be equivalent to writ-
ing over the endorsement. You have refused to pay the note to me 
when it was due, therefore pay it to A. B. at sight. The endorsee could 
draw no such conclusion as that the terms of the note were to be altered; 
and if he was told that such was the arrangement, he would be apt to 
reply, You have been unable to compel payment in three months, it is 
of course out of the question that he would pay me instantly at sight. 
No, I take this on your credit, I trust you, give me your name ·in blank 
33Jd. at 400. 
34''!£ an indorser take an assignment, mortgage, or confession of judgment 
from the maker to protect his liability; or when the drawer has no funds in the 
hands of the drawee, and it is known to the holder; or the drawer informs the 
holder that the bill will not be paid at maturity, no notice of demand is neces-
sary." Id. at 399. For the present law see sections 114 and 115 of the Negotiable 
Instruments Law. 
35Jd. at 400. 
3612 Pa. St. 269 (1849). 
37Patterson v. Todd, 18 Pa. St. 426, 433, 57 Am. Dec. 622, 626 (1852). This 
case limits the earlier decision to a holding that insolvency of the maker dis-
penses with the necessity of notice. 
54 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
and I will advance the money. Such would be the natural course of 
things among men of common sense, versed in business affairs."38 
In an early case, Mr. Justice Cheves of South Carolina, speak-
ing for the three non-prevailing members of an equally divided 
court, said: 
". . . When the bill or note has been already dishonored-the 
drawer or endorser already has all the notice which in other cases is 
required. His case is then exactly like that of a drawer or endorser, 
after a demand duly made and notice of default duly given; after which, 
nothing will discharge him but payment of the note or bill, unless the 
holder give time to those on whom the d,_rawer or endorser is entitled 
to have recourse. No delay or indulgence, which is merely passive, will 
discharge him."89 
It has been held under special circumstances that where an 
instrument is reissued when past due without further indorsement 
by one who indorsed prior to maturity, and whose liability was fixed 
by presentment and notice at the due date, there is an estoppel 
against assertion that liability does not continue.40 
In a few cases where a note, as distinguished from a bill, has 
been indorsed after mat\}rity, it has been said that the negotiation 
constituted the making of a "new note," the maker of the original 
instrument being regarded as also the maker of the new one.41 In 
ssJordan v. Hurst, supra note 36, at 271. 
saRugeley v. Davidson, 2 Mill Const. 33, 48 (S. C. 1818). 
40Libbey v. Pierce, 47 N. H. 309 (1867) (the plaintiffs took up the note 
at the defendants' request from a bank which had discounted it for the de-
fendants); St. John v. Roberts, 31 N. Y. 441, 88 Am. Dec. 287 (1865) (the pro-
tested note was sold at auction, without any statement as to in whose behalf 
it was· being sold); Coleman v. Dunlap, 18 S. C. 591 (1882) (semble as to estoppel 
as the basis). In Hunt v. Wadleigh, 26 Me. 271 (1846), an opposite result was 
reached, without noticing estoppel. This decision is criticized in 2 Theophilus 
Parsons, Notes and Bills (1863) p. 14. And see 3 R. C. L. (perm. ed. 1929) 1179. 
In Montgomery & Eufaula R. Co. v. Trebles, 44 Ala. 255 (1881), where there was 
a second indorsement, it was held to be a question df intention upon which ·the 
defendant was to be bound. 
41The "new note" reasoning first appears in 1721, in a case involving a 
point of pleading in a suit against an indorser of a note, the report not show-
ing whether the indorsement was before or after maturity. It was said, ". . • 
Every indorsement is the same as making a new note .... " Smallwood v. Ver-
non, 1 Strange 478, 93 Eng. Rep. 646 (K. B. 1721). Other "new note" cases, ar-
ranged chronologically, are: Brown v. Davies, 3 T. R. 80, 100 Eng. Rep. 466 (K. B. 
1789) (held that maker could show payment as against one taking from payee after 
maturity); Hall v. Smith, 1 S. C. Law 330 (1793) (held, that when a note is 
indorsed after due "it is not subject to such strict rules as a note indorsed before 
due," and that, as against defense of laches in endeavoring to recover from 
the maker before he became insolvent, the jury was justified in finding that 
due diligence in bringing suit had been exercised-while it is stated that the 
instrument is to be considered "as a new drawn note, by the indorser," the 
indorser is treated as such, and not as a·malter); Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Me. 
116 (1860) (held that the required demand and notice occurred within a reason-
able time-"as between indorser and indorsee, such note is to be treated as a 
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no case that has arisen has the substitution of the conception of a 
"new note" for that of a "new bill" affected the result. In connec-
tion with a single transfer after maturity of either type of instru-
ment, presentment and notice must be made within a reasonable 
time. No case has involved such action after a succession of post-
maturity transfers. Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law, even 
with a number of transfers the difference was immaterial, since, in 
order to hold an indorser upon either a note or bill, as still under 
the Bills of Exchange Act,42 it was necessary that presentment be 
made within a reasonable time after the particular indorsement. 
Under the mistaken provision of the Uniform Act that, in connection 
with a bill, presentment is sufficient if made within a reasonable 
time after the last negotiation,43 the difference is material. It is to 
be doubted whether any court would apply the "new note" doctrine 
in such a case. Every "new note" case was decided prior to the 
Uniform Act. Support of the "new note" doctrine, as contrasted with 
that of the "new bill," has been negligible, and it will not be further 
considered. 
Every semblance of opposition to the "new bill" doctrine in the 
present connection which has been discovered has been presented. 
The doctrine rem~ins under the Negotiable Instruments Law. As 
the act does not expressly negative the doctrine, it is impliedly car-
ried forward by the provisions, already referred to, that an instru-
ment negotiable in its origin continues to be such until discharged 
or restrictively indorsed,44 and that an instrument indorsed when 
overdue is payable upon demand,45 coupl~d with the provisions re-
quiring presentment and notice in connection with demand instru-
ments. 4e The "new bill" theory is set forth in the annotated edition 
note on demand, dated at the time of the transfer, so far as demand and notice 
are concerned"); Frech v. Yawger, 47 N. J. Law 157, 54 Am. Rep. 123 (1885) 
(question whether liability of indorser assumed). In the following cases, ar-
ranged chronologically, "new note" and "new bill" reasoning is used inter-
changeably: Colt v. Bernard, 35 Mass. 260, 29 Am. Dec. 584 (1836); Leidy v. 
Tammany, 9 W. & S. 353 (Pa. 1840); McKewer v. Kirtland, 33 Iowa 348 (1871); 
Brown v. Hull, 33 Gratt. 23 (Va. 1880); Furgerson v. Staples, 82 Me. 159, 19 Atl. 
158 (1889). 
42Secs. 45 (2), 86 (1). 
43Sec. 71, criticized in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, Annotated 
(Beutel's 5th ed. 1932) p. 784; Williston, Negotiable Instruments (1931) p. 142. 
Obviously, in holding an earlier indorser it ought to be immaterial that present-
ment and notice occur within a reasonable time after a subsequent negotiation, 
possibly years later. 
44Sec. 47. 
45Sec. 7. The inference is strengthened by the statement that this is true, 
in connection with issuance, acceptance, or indorsement after maturity, "as re-
gards the person so issuing, accepting, or indorsing it." lbid. 
46Sec. 71. While sections 79 and 114(4) dispense with presentment and notice 
when the drawer "has no right to expect or require" payment by. the drawee or 
acceptor, it cannot be said that the post-maturity indorser is in this position, and 
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of the act prepared by its author.47 Numerous cases have applied 
the doctrine in the present connection since the passage of the act,48 
and the doctrine must be regarded as firmly established. 
On the other hand, the numerous cases applying or stating the 
doctrine which have not been discussed/9 including all the cases 
since 1859, contribute no additional thought in regard to the reason 
or justification for its exi~tence. Neither has any such text discus-
sion, other- than a criticism of "new bill" terminology as applied to 
although sections 82 (3) and 109 provide for implied waiver of presentment and 
notice, if the indorsement must be regarded as a new bill, there is nothing upon 
which to base such an implication. The "new bill" doctrine prevents such an im-
plication from the circumstances. It would seem that the courts would have been 
justified originally in making such an implication, but it is now too late to hope 
for judicial repudiation of the application of the doctrine in the pi:esent connec-
tion upon that basis. 
47Crawford, Negotiable Instruments Law (4th ed. 1916) p. 143. 
4SSee citations of cases before and af-ter act, arranged chronologically, in the 
following footnote. 
49The arrangement is chronological. The following cases apply the doctrine, 
not all eo nomine, and discharge. the indorser because of the absence of present-
ment and notice within a reasonable time: Ecfert v. Des Coudres, 1 Mill Const. 
69, 12 Am. Dec. 609 (S. C., 1817); Dwight v. Emerson, 2 N. H. 159 (1819); Course & 
M'Farlane v. Shackleford, 11 S. C. Law 283 (1820); Stewart v. French, Fed. Cas. 
No. 13,427 (C. C. D. C. 1822); Cox v.·Jones, Fed. Cas. No. 3303 (C. C. D. C. 1823); 
Nash v. Harrington, 2 Aikens 9, 16 Am. Dec. 672 (Va. 1826); Allwood v. Haseldon, 
18 S. C. Law 457 (1831); Benton v. Gibson, 19 S. C. Law 56 (1833); Colt v. Bernard, 
supra note 41; Kennon v. McRae, 7 Port. 175 (Ala. 1838); Greely v. Hunt, 21 Me. 
455 (1842); Adams Adm'r v. Torbert, 6 Ala. 865 (1844); Corwith v. Morrison, 1 Pinn. 
489 (Wis. 1845); Sanborn v. Southard, 25 Me. 409 (1845); Branch Bank of State v. 
Gaffney, 9 Ala. 153 (1846); Hunt v. Wadleigh, supra note 40; Jones v. Robinson, 
11 Ark. 504, 54 Am. Dec. 212 (1851); Mudd v. Harper, 1 Md. 110, 54 Am. Dec. 644 
(1851); Patterson v. Todd & Lemon, supra note 37; Levy v. Drew, 14 Ark. 334 
(1854); Tyler v. Young, 30 Pa. St. 143 (1858); Guild v. Goldsmith, Haber & Co., 9 
Fla. 212 (1860); McCall v. Witkowski, 16 La. Ann. 179 (1861); Hart & Munson v. 
Eastman & Gibson, 7 Minn. 74 (1862); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 36 Mo. 225 (1865); 
Chandler v. Westfall, 30 Tex. 476 (1867) (this is a "carpetbagger" decision, which 
would not be cited in Texas); Roquest & Gilkinson v. Pickett, 20 La. Ann. 546 
(1868); Winston v. Kelly, 33 Tex. 354 (1870); Bemis v. McKenzie, 13 Fla. 553 (1870); 
Jones v. Middleton, 29 Iowa 188 (1870); McKewer v. Kirtland, 33 Iowa 348 (1871); 
Light v. Kingsbury, 50 Mo. 331 (1872); Pryor v. Bowman, 38 Iowa 92 (1874); Swartz 
v. Redfield, 13 Kan. 550 (1874); Crooks v. Tulley & Durkin, 50 Cal. 255 (1875); 
Dixon v. Clayville, 44 Md. 573 (1875); Beeler v. Frost, 70 Mo. 185 (1879); Eisenlord 
v. Dillenback, 79 N. Y. 617 (1879); Graul v. Strutzel, 53 Iowa 712 (1880); Shelby v. 
,Judd, 24 Kan. 161 (1880); Smith v. Caro & Baum, 9 Ore. 278 (1881); Bassenhorst v. 
Wilby, 45 Ohio St. 333, 13 N. E. 75 (1887); Lank v. Morrison, 44 Kan. 594, 24 Pac. 
1106 (1890); Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90, 16 S. W. 66 (1891); Beer v. Clifton, 98 
Cal. 323, 33 Pac. 204, 35 Am. St. Rep. 172, 20 L. R. A. 580 (1893); Landon v. Bryant, 
69 Vt. 203, 37 Atl. 297 (1896); German· Am. Bank of Rochester v. Atwater, 165 N. Y. 
36, 58 N. E. 763 (1900); Moore v. Alexander, 63 App. Div. 100, 71 N. Y. S. 420 (1901); 
Wells v. Booth, 6 Cal. App. 197 (1907); Gate City Nat. Bank v. Schmidt, 168 Mo. 
App. 153, 152 S. W. 103 (1912); Hawkins v. Shields, 100 Miss. 739, 57 So. 4 (1912); 
Torgerson v. Ohnstad, 149 Minn. 46, 182 N. W. 724 (1921); Foundry Mfg. Co. v. 
Farr, 96 Vt. 382, 119 Atl. 885 (1923); Carter v. Jennings, 134 Miss. 263, 98 So. 687 
(1924); Baker v. Valentine, 216 Ky. 801, 288 S. W. 771 (1926); Morgan v. Huffman, 
76 Mont. 396, 247 Pac. 326 (1926); Sledge & Norfleet v. Dye, 151 Miss. 693, 118 So. 
414 (1928). 
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indorsements generally,50 been found. 51 After reading the many 
thousands of words in these opinions, one is impressed with the 
unreasoning force of historic precedent, particularly in the field of 
negotiable instruments, and with the futility of much of the reported 
case material. From generation to generation there is recreated 
thus the need for scholarly comprehensive surveys of the various 
fields. 
The "new bill" doctrine, as applied to the present problem, is 
the outgrowth of a mode of thought and expression which was valu-
able, and possibly indispensable, in the historical development of 
the law of negotiable instruments. It furnished a rationale for the 
assimilation of the position of the indorser to that of the drawer, 
and made possible the great advantages to be derived from the lia-
bility of a number of secondary parties, coming in at different times, 
upon the same negotiable instrument. It possibly still has value 
as establishing the principle that one taking after maturity may 
acquire the position of a holder in due course in relation to those 
indorsing after maturity. Possibly it was inevitable that the doc-
trine should be applied as it has been in connection with the present 
problem. The strongest argument which has been advanced for a 
continuance of this application of it is the necessity for simplicity 
50Professor Lile, in the last edition of Bigelow, presents a discriminating 
analysis: ''In the language of the law books, indorsement is frequently referred 
to as the equivalent of the drawing of a bill of exchange. Such statements, how-
ever, should be taken only as a free expression of a general truth. There are 
many points of resemblance between the two acts, and therefore the liability of 
the drawer and indorser of a bill, as already shown, is in most respects similar, 
and hence is so treated in the present chapter. But material points of difference 
exist, as noted in the preceding chapter-as for example in the matter of reason-
able ground to draw in the case of a bill, and the necessity of drawing on funds 
in the case of a check. With these the indorser has no concern, and hence his 
indorsement is not always the equivalent of the drawing of a bill. So indorse-
ment of a check, or of a promissory note, cannot be said to be the equivalent of 
drawing a bill. Again, indorsement requires no negotiable words, while it is other-
wise in the drawing of a bill. Indeed, the statement that indorsement is equivalent 
to drawing a bill is rlllsleading in many cases, and necessary in none. It would be 
better to say that indorsement is an order on the drawee, acceptor or maker, to 
pay to the holder according to the tenor of the instrument. But to say this, adds 
little or nothing of value to the explanation of the indorser's contract." Bigelow, 
Bills, Notes and Checks (Lile's 3rd ed. 1928) p. 166. 
nThe "new bill' doctrine is presented, eo nomine unless noted otherwise, in 
the following texts, arranged chronologically: Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the 
Law of Evidence, in Civil and Criminal Cases, and a Treatise on Bills of Exchange, 
and Promissory Notes (1810) pp. 301, 309; Chitty, Bills of Exchange (6th ed. 1826) 
pp. 126, 141; 2 Theophilus Parsons, op. cit. supra note 40, at 13; 2 Theophilus Parsons, 
Contracts (7th ed. 1883) p. 256 (not eo nomine) ; Tiedeman, Commercial Paper 
(1889) p. 336 (not eo nomine) ; 2 Randolph, Commercial Paper (2d ed. 1899) p. 671; 
1 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (6th ed.1914) p. 611; 2 id. at 996; 8 C. J. 639 (1916); 
1 Paton's Digest (1926) §§2689-2690, 3965; 2 id. §§2689a, 3965a; Redfield, Commercial 
Paper (1929) pp. 161, 194; 3 R. C. L. (perm. ed. 1929) 1178 (not eo nomine) ; Williston, 
op. cit. supra note 43, at 217 (not eo nomine); Ogden, Negotiable Instruments (3rd 
ed. 1931) p. 324 (not eo nomine). 
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and certainty in the law relating to mercantile matters. It is not 
believed that this principle offers a sufficient answer to the hitherto 
unnoticed objection to the doctrine, that as here applied it operates 
as a "trap for the unwary." 
Only in rare instances will subsequent presentment and notice 
be the means of affording any genuine added protection to the one 
who indorses after maturity, and then he should have secured it 
for himself. , By indorsing he should be held to make the warranties 
of an indorser, and to assume liability for payment. These con-
siderations, coupled with the convenience of the indorsement as a 
~eans of giving written evidence of the transfer of the chose in 
action held at maturity, offer sufficient answer to the inquiry, why 
indorse, why not give his own note, if there is to be no required 
presentment for payment. 
As has been suggested judicially, it would be possible to con-
sider the undertaking of the indorser after maturity as that of a 
guarantor of collection, requiring reasonable efforts to collect first 
from the primary party. It is believed that even this is not a reason-
able interpretation to be placed upon the conduct of the parties. 
The position of the guarantor of collection, as compared with. that of 
secondary parties generally, is a privileged one. To give a secondary 
party that position, express words or special circumstances clearly 
indicating that the parties had such an intention are required. It is 
not believed that this is such a situation. From the standpoint of the 
objection now being urged, this solution is objectionable only in 
lesser degree. The position of the indorsee should not be jeopard-
ized by such a requirement. 
Only at the original maturity date of a negotiable instrument 
should presentment and notice be required. As to any later neces-
sity for such action, resort should be had to the maxim commencing, 
"when the reason for the rule ceases." In view of the want of any 
sufficient reason for requiring in his behalf subsequent presentment 
and notice, the position of the indorser after maturity should be the 
same as that of an indorser whose liability has been fixed by such 
action duly taken at maturity. As to the indorser after maturity, 
as in connection with proceedings against secondary parties gen-
erally, no steps to collect first from the primary party should be 
required. In future legislation the requirement of presentment for 
payment and notice of dishonor in order to charge ~ indorser after 
maturity should be eliminated. 
